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Abstract 
 The Propositional Evaluation Paradigm (PEP; Müller and Rothermund, 2019) has 
recently shown promise as a relational implicit measure (i.e., an implicit measure which can 
specify how stimuli are related). Whereas the standard PEP measures response times, 
mousetracking is becoming increasingly-popular for quantifying response competition, with 
distinct advantages beyond response times. Across four preregistered experiments (N = 737), 
we interface the utility of the PEP method with the unique benefits of mousetracking by 
developing a mousetracking PEP (MT-PEP). The MT-PEP very effectively captured group-
level beliefs across domains (Experiments 1-4). It produced larger effects (Experiment 3), 
exhibited superior predictive validity (Experiment 3), and better split-half reliability 
(Experiments 3-4) than the standard PEP. Both PEPs appear to be intentionally controllable, 
particularly the MT-PEP (Experiments 3-4). Nevertheless, the MT-PEP shows strong 
potential in capturing relational information, and may be considered implicit in the sense of 
capturing fast and unaware (but not unintentional) responding.   
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The shape of belief: Developing a mousetracking-based relational implicit measure  
 Implicit measures.  
In spite of their status as go-to procedures for assessing mental processes under 
automaticity conditions (De Houwer et al., 2020; Van Dessel et al., 2020; Gawronski & 
Sritharan, 2010), most implicit measures (e.g., the Implicit Association Test; IAT, Greenwald 
et al., 1998; the Affect Misattribution Procedure; AMP, Payne et al., 2005) cannot specify 
relational information in their procedures. The IAT is capable of telling us that two concepts 
are related (e.g., that men are more related to doctors than women) but not how those stimuli 
are related. Imagine two participants exhibit such a Men-Doctors IAT effect of magnitude X. 
Participant 1’s effect may be driven by the belief that there are more male doctors than 
female doctors. Participant 2’s effect, on the other hand, may be driven by the belief that 
there should be more male doctors than female doctors. These different kinds of implicit 
beliefs can have very different impacts on behavior (De Houwer et al., 2020; Heider et al., 
2015; Remue et al., 2014). 
Improving implicit measures 
Given these limitations, relational implicit measures have been developed to capture 
such relational information (De Houwer et al., 2015; Cummins & De Houwer, 2019). One 
promising measure is the Propositional Evaluation Paradigm (PEP; Müller & Rothermund, 
2019). Briefly, the PEP harnesses (in)consistencies between presented sentences and required 
responses (e.g., being required to respond “false” after seeing a sentence that the participant 
agrees with) in order to assess beliefs. The PEP has already shown promise in measuring 
gender stereotypes and anti-immigrant racism (Müller & Rothermund, 2019). 
Implicit measures can also be improved in ways beyond relational information. In 
particular, implicit measures typically use response times (RTs) as their dependent variable. 
However, other outcomes measures can provide advantages beyond RTs. Mousetracking, for 
example, allows researchers to view the unfolding of responding across a trial, whereas RTs 
cannot provide this information (Freeman, 2018; Hehman et al., 2015). Indeed, 
mousetracking has already been incorporated into the IAT in two previous studies (Smeding 
et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2012). In particular, Yu and colleagues demonstrated that both 
response options in the IAT were partially and simultaneously activated during responding on 
the incompatible block of the IAT. Such a finding gives a critical insight into the dynamics of 
behavior within the IAT, which could not be observed through RTs.  
The current study. 
Given the promise of the PEP and the advantages of mousetracking, we aimed to 
develop and validate a mousetracking PEP (MT-PEP) as a measure of automatic beliefs. 
Experiment 1 tested whether the MT-PEP was capable of producing group-level effects using 
factually true or false sentences. Experiment 2 examined whether effects in the MT-PEP 
reflected automatic processes by using sentences which differed in automatic and deliberated 
truth values. Experiment 3 tested whether the MT-PEP (and RT-PEP) were sensitive to 
beliefs about immigrants, and also assessed the fakeability of the two measures. Experiment 4 
examined whether modifying the PEPs could reduce the impact of faking. 
Experiment 1 
 In addition to testing whether the MT-PEP can produce effects using factually true 
and false stimuli, we investigated whether MT-PEP effects were moderated by the proportion 
of ‘catch’ trials presented. Catch trials require participants to respond to the truth-value of the 
sentence stimuli rather than the true/false probes. Due to its preliminary nature, this first 
experiment was not preregistered (all subsequent experiments were preregistered). 
Method 
Full details of the procedure and materials for all experiments can be found in the 
Online Supplementary Materials (OSM). All materials, data, processing and analysis scripts 
(and preregistrations Experiments 2-4) can be found on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/f4mvr/). For brevity, we describe exploratory analyses only when they are 
directly relevant to the focus of the manuscript; the results of additional exploratory analyses 
are presented in the OSM. Data were collected from participants at Ghent University 
(Experiments 1-2) or Prolific Academic (Experiments 3-4). 
Participants. 50 participants provided complete data (34 female, 14 male, 2 no 
gender given) with a mean age of 21.94 years (SD = 2.30). This sample size provides 90% 
power to detect a medium Cohen’s d effect size (d = 0.47) in our paired-samples t-tests. 
Materials.  MT-PEP. The MT-PEP consisted of 240 trials using two trial types: 
‘probe’ trials and ‘catch’ trials. Participants were required to respond ‘true’ or ‘false’ on each 
trial by moving the mouse from a starting position (in the bottom-centre of the screen) to 
either the top-left or top-right of the screen. All trials consisted of a sentence presented word-
by-word followed by a prompt. On probe trials, this was either the word ‘TRUE’ or 
‘FALSE’. In these trials, participants were required to respond based on the probe word and 
to ignore the preceding sentence. We refer to trials where the required response and the truth 
value of the sentence were the same as “consistent” trials, and trials where the truth value of 
the sentences differed from the required response, as “inconsistent” trials. On catch trials, 
participants were presented with the prompt “?? TRUE OR FALSE ??”, and were required to 
respond “true” (“false”) if the sentence was true (false). If the participant responded 
incorrectly on either trial type they were presented with error feedback. Between participants, 
the proportion of probe trials to catch trials was varied. Half of the participants completed a 
10% catch-trial MT-PEP, which the other half completed a 30% catch-trial MT-PEP. Stimuli 
within the PEP in this experiment consisted of 20 factually true and false statements about the 
relative size of different stimuli (e.g., “A continent is bigger than a computer”; see OSM for 
full information).  
Procedure. Participants provided informed consent and demographic information, 
then completed the 30% or 10% MT-PEP. Participants then answered exploratory questions 
(see OSM).  
Results 
We analysed two mousetracking measures: area-under-curve (AUC) and maximum 
deviation (MD). AUC refers to the area between an optimal response trajectory (i.e., a 
straight line from the starting position to the response option) and participants’ time-
normalized average trajectories. A larger AUC score indicates greater deviation of the mouse 
towards the alternative response option, which indicates an automatic tendency towards this 
alternative (Hehman et al., 2015). The MD also makes reference to this idealized trajectory, 
but instead refers to the largest distance between this idealized trajectory and time-
normalized response trajectories. Again, larger MD scores indicate greater deviation towards 
the alternative response.  
 Hypothesis Testing. We first investigated whether AUC scores differed between trial 
types. Using a paired samples t-test, we found a significant effect of truth consistency on 
AUCs in the expected direction; AUCs were larger for inconsistent compared to consistent 
trials, t(49) = 7.21, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.02, 95% CI [0.68, 1.37]. This pattern was also 
reflected in MD scores, t(49) = 7.59, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.07, 95% CI [0.73, 1.43], and 
RTs, t(49) = 5.51, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.78, 95% CI [0.46, 1.10]. We next tested whether 
MT-PEP effects differed between proportions of catch trials using 3 mixed within-between 
ANOVAs. We found the expected interaction between truth consistency and proportion of 
catch trials for AUCs (F(1, 94) = 5.74, p = .019; see Figure 1) and MDs (F(1, 94) = 4.82, p = 
.031), but not RTs (F(1, 94) = 0.43, p = .51). 
 
Figure 1. Time-normalized response trajectories for both consistent and inconsistent trials in 
both versions of the MT-PEP. Responses have been remapped for illustrative purposes, such 
that the “correct” response option is always on the right-hand-side of the plot. The dark black 
line represents the optimal response trajectory, with larger deviations from this line indicating 
greater attraction towards the alternative response option.  
 
Discussion 
 These results provide initial support for the MT-PEP. Participants in both the 30% 
and 10% condition showed larger AUC and MD scores (and RTs) on consistent compared to 
inconsistent trials. AUC and MD effect sizes also increased as a function of greater 
proportions of catch trials.  
Experiment 2 
 Truth evaluations can be either well-considered (the concentrated integration of 
multiple pieces of information) or immediate (an initial truth evaluation based on limited 
information). In some cases, immediate and well-considered truth evaluations can be 
different, as is the case when categorising atypical category exemplars (e.g., “a whale is a 
mammal” is immediately evaluated as false, but after consideration is evaluated as true; Dale 
et al., 2007). If PEP effects reflect well-considered truth evaluations, they should not differ 
between typical (“a rabbit is a mammal”) and atypical (e.g., “a whale is a mammal”) 
exemplars. However, if they capture a more automatic truth evaluation, then typical 
exemplars should produce larger PEP effects than atypical exemplars.  
Method  
Participants. Our final sample consisted of 48 participants (37 female and 11 male) 
with a mean age of 21.85 years (SD = 4.83). Similarly to Experiment 1, 48 participants 
provides 90% power to detect a medium Cohen’s d effect size (d = 0.48) in our paired-
samples t-tests.  
Materials. The MT-PEP was programmed and administered using PsychoPy 3.0 
(Peirce et al., 2019).  
MT-PEP. 
We use only PEPs with 30% catch trials for the remainder of our experiments. Stimuli 
in the MT-PEP consisted of animal-category statements in the form “A(n) [animal] is a(n) 
[category]”. Sentence stimuli were taken from Dale et al. (2007; see OSM). Importantly, 
these sentences consisted of typical (e.g., “a rabbit is a mammal”), or atypical-exemplars 
(e.g., “a whale is a mammal”).  
Results 
 In all subsequent experiments we analyse only AUC scores (AUC and MD were near-
perfectly correlated in Experiment 1, r = .98). For all analyses, results did not differ by using 
AUCs vs. MDs. In subsequent experiments, we utilise linear mixed-effects models when 
conducting analyses relating to group-level PEP effects in order to maximise statistical 
power. 
 Hypothesis Testing. Scores were larger on inconsistent than consistent trials, for 
AUCs (t(47) = 9.41, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.36, 95% CI [0.97, 1.77]; see Figure 2) and RTs 
(t(47) = 7.11, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.03, 95% CI [0.68, 1.39]). 
 
Figure 2. Normalized mouse trajectories for typical-consistent and typical-inconsistent trial 
types in Experiment 2. 
 
In our mixed-effects model we found the expected consistency * typicality interaction 
for AUCs, β = 0.07, 95% CI [0.04, 0.10], p < .001 (see Figure 3). We did not find this 
significant interaction in an equivalent fixed effects analysis, F(1, 184) = 0.66, p = .419. For 
RTs, we did not find a significant interaction in either the mixed-effects model (β = 0.03, 
95% CI [-0.00, 0.06], p = 0.057) or the fixed-effects model (F(1, 184) = 0.003, p = .958). In 
follow-up analyses1 recommended by a reviewer, we investigated which point in the time-
course of responding the consistency * typicality interaction emerged: in other words, at what 
point the difference in x coordinates between consistent and inconsistent trials became 
greater for typical, compared to atypical, trials. To do this, we conducted linear mixed-effects 
analyses at each of the 101 normalised response timepoints, modelling consistency and 
typicality as fixed effects, and x coordinates as the DV. The typicality * consistency 
 
1 Presented in the analysis file for Experiment 2.  
interaction was significant (with Bonferroni correction) between the 3rd and 55th normalised 
timepoints, indicating this effect emerged very early in the response time-course.   
 
Figure 3. Normalized mouse trajectories for all 4 consistency-typicality trial types.  
 
Discussion 
 We again demonstrated the basic MT-PEP effect (for typical-exemplars). Analyses of 
AUCs showed that this effect was moderated by sentence typicality: MT-PEP effects were 
larger for typical- compared to atypical-exemplar trials, albeit only in the more statistically-
powerful mixed-effects analysis. This suggests that MT-PEP effects at least in part reflect the 
immediate, automatic (in the sense of fast) truth evaluation of sentences.   
Experiment 3 
The MT-PEP appears sensitive to factually true and false sentences. However, it is 
unclear whether MT-PEP effects arise for subjective beliefs (see Heiphetz et al., 2014). As 
Müller and Rothermund (2019) previously did using the RT-PEP, in the current experiment 
we tested whether the MT-PEP (and RT-PEP) were sensitive to beliefs relating to 
immigrants, and  whether PEP effects correlated with deliberated beliefs. In addition, we 
examined whether effects in either PEP could be faked, both at the group-level or at the 
individual differences level. Because participants are less aware of mouse movements than 
RTs, and knowledge of the measured variable increases the fakeability of tasks (Hughes et 
al., 2016; Röhner et al., 2013; Steffens, 2004; though see Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005), we 
expected that the MT-PEP would be less fakeable than the RT-PEP. 
Method  
Participants. Our final sample consisted of 205 participants (79 men, 123 women, 1 
agender, 1 non-binary, 1 no gender given) with a mean age of 31.66 years (SD = 10.84). 107 
completed the RT-PEP; 98 completed the MT-PEP. Across our analyses, this provides us 
with 90% power to detect a minimal Cohen’s d effect size of d = 0.50 (i.e., in our linear 
regression with three interactive predictors). 
Materials. All materials were programmed and administered using lab.js (Henninger 
et al., 2019).   
MT-PEP. We modified the MT-PEP very slightly to facilitate online data collection 
(see OSM).  
RT-PEP. The RT-PEP was identical to the MT-PEP, except that participants 
responded using key presses ( ‘A’ and ‘L’ keys).  
Self-reported beliefs. Self-reported anti-immigrant beliefs were assessed using the 
Modern and Classic Racism Scales (McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Scores 
from the two scales were averaged into one compound score, similarly to Müller and 
Rothermund (2019). Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for both the Classic (a = 0.90, 95% CI 
[0.88, 0.92]) and Modern (a = 0.86, 95% CI [0.83, 0.89]) Scales were acceptable.  
Procedure. Participants were collected in two groups: first the control group 
completed the study after receiving standard instructions. From this we established that our 
participants generally exhibited pro-immigrant beliefs, and thus that faking instructions 
should require participants to fake anti-immigrant beliefs. We then ran a second group of 
participants who were instructed to fake strong anti-immigrant beliefs. Participants provided 
demographic information, then completed the MT- or RT-PEP. After the PEP, faking 
participants were told to cease faking. Participants then completed the self-report measures. 
Results 
Hypothesis Testing. When assessing anti-immigrant beliefs, we refer to two trial 
types: pro-immigrant trials and anti-immigrant trials. Pro-immigrant trials consisted of either 
a pro-immigrant sentence followed by the probe word ‘true’, or anti-immigrant sentences 
followed by the probe word ‘false’ (i.e., these responses indicate pro-immigrant beliefs). 
Anti-immigrant trials consisted of converse configurations to pro-immigrant trials. MT-PEP 
(RT-PEP) scores were calculated based on the difference between AUCs (RTs) in pro- vs. 
anti-immigrant trials, such that a more positive score indicated stronger anti-immigrant 
beliefs. 
At the group-level, RTs in the RT-PEP were significantly shorter on pro-immigrant 
trials compared to anti-immigrant trials, β = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.01], p = .004. Likewise, 
AUCs in the MT-PEP were smaller for pro-immigrant trials, β = -0.23, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.21], 
p < .001 (see Figure 4). We also found this pattern in t-tests for both the RT-PEP, t(55) = 
3.040, p = .003, Cohen’s d = 0.41, 95% CI [0.13, 0.68] and MT-PEP, t(50) = 8.946, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.25, 95% CI [0.89, 1.63]. At the individual-level, larger anti-immigrant effects 
in both the RT-PEP (r = .28, 95% CI [.02, .51], p = .034) and the MT-PEP (r = .41, 95% CI 
[.15, .61], p = .003) correlated with greater self-reported beliefs.  
 
Figure 4. Time-normalised mouse trajectories for pro- and anti-immigrant trials in the MT-
PEP control condition (Experiment 3). 
 
We next investigated group-level faking. We firstly compared PEP effects in the 
control and faking conditions for each PEP. Effects in the faking condition were significantly 
different, in the opposing direction, to effects in the control condition, for both the RT-PEP, β 
= 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.08], p < .001, and the MT-PEP, β = 0.35, 95% CI [0.32, 0.38], p < 
.001. When comparing the PEPs, we found a significant interaction effect between PEP 
variant and condition in predicting (standardised) PEP effects, β = -0.64, 95% CI [-0.96, -
0.31], p < .001. Faking was stronger in the MT-PEP compared to the RT-PEP (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Mean (standardised) group-level effects in the RT- and MT-PEP in Experiment 3. 
Experimental condition PEP variant 
 RT-PEP MT-PEP 
Control -0.07 (0.13) -0.47 (0.35) 
Faking 0.05 (0.11) 0.34 (0.46) 
 
We next examined whether faking impacted the ability of the PEPs to predict 
individual differences in self-reported beliefs. Counter to our expectations, condition (control 
vs. faking) did not influence the prediction of self-report scores by PEP effects differently for 
the MT-PEP than for the RT-PEP, β = 0.35, 95% CI [-0.33, 1.03], p = .310. The ability of 
PEP scores to predict self-reported beliefs was not significantly moderated by experimental 
condition for the MT-PEP (β = -0.44, 95% CI [-0.99, 0.11, p = .119) or the RT-PEP (β = -
0.03, 95% CI [-0.44, 0.38], p = .875; see Table 2). 
Table 2. Coefficients (95% CIs in square brackets) for the prediction of self-report scores for 
each condition and each PEP variant in Experiment 3. Coefficients marked with an asterisk 
denote significance from zero (p < .05).  
MT-PEP Control .41* [.15, .61] 
Faking .11 [-.19, .41] 
RT-PEP Control .28* [.02, .51] 
Faking .18 [-.10, .46] 
 
Exploratory Testing. Standardized effect sizes in the MT-PEP were larger than in 
the RT-PEP, t(105) = 2.05, p = .042, Cohen’s d = 0.40, 95% CI [0.01, 0.78]. Split-half 
reliabilities for the MT-PEP were high, but the reliabilities for the RT-PEP were poor (see 
Table 3). We examined AUC scores on the catch trials of the MT-PEP between trials where 
participants responded in a pro-immigrant manner and trials where participants responded in 
an anti-immigrant manner. We found a significant interaction between trial type and faking 
condition on catch trial AUCs, β = -0.63, 95% CI [-1.12, -0.14], p = .011. AUCs were larger 
for anti-immigrant trials than for pro-immigrant trials in the faking condition (β = -.61, 95% 
CI [-.93, -.29], p < .001, but did not differ in the control condition (β = -.00, 95% CI [-.37, 
.36], p = .993; see Figure 5). Notably, we did not find this significant interaction effect when 
examining RTs in catch trials of the RT-PEP, β = -0.22, 95% CI [-0.59, 0.16], p = .259. 
Table 3. The split-half reliabilities of the MT-PEP and RT-PEP in the control and faking 
conditions in experiments 3 and 4. 
Experiment 3 MT-PEP Control Rsb = .83, [.71, .90] 
Faking Rsb = .85, [.73, .92] 
RT-PEP Control Rsb = -.27, [~-1, 
.25] 
Faking Rsb = -.06, [-.64, 
.46] 
Experiment 4 MT-PEP Control Rsb = .45, [.21, .62] 
Faking Rsb = .50, [.28, .66] 
RT-PEP Control Rsb = -.39, [~-1, 
.04] 
Faking Rsb = .13, [-.24, .40] 
 
 
Figure 5. The AUC scores for catch trials in the MT-PEP on which participants responded in 
a pro- or anti-immigrant manner in the control and faking conditions.  
 
Discussion. 
 Our results suggest that the MT-PEP and RT-PEP were sensitive to group-level 
immigrant-related beliefs. MT- and RT-PEP effects also correlated with individual 
differences in anti-immigrant beliefs. Both PEPs were fakeable at the group-level, but faking 
impacted the MT-PEP more than the RT-PEP. However, when faking in the MT-PEP, 
participants still exhibited pro-immigrant responses on MT-PEP catch trials. Notably, faking 
did not reduce the relationship between either PEP and self-report scores. 
 Why might the PEPs be susceptible to group-level faking? One potential explanation 
could be that our faking instructions resulted in the absence of an important component of 
PEP effects: a truth evaluation mindset. That is, a truth evaluation mindset is arguably 
induced via the catch trials (Wiswede et al., 2013). However, catch trials served a different 
purpose for participants in the faking condition: they offered a context where participants 
must respond as if they have a specific belief (i.e., not evaluating based on their own 
opinions). As a result, it is likely that no truth evaluation mindset was induced.  
Experiment 4 
PEP effects might be less fakeable if an evaluation mindset could be maintained while 
faking. A variant of the PEP already exists which can help us test this: in their second and 
third experiments, Müller and Rothermund (2019) used catch trials where participants needed 
to identify whether there was a spelling mistake present in sentences, rather than truth-
evaluate them. Responses to these catch trials should not vary based on whether a participant 
is faking or not. Thus, an evaluation mindset should be induced for all participants, which 
should reduce the impact of faking. Müller and Rothermund state this this manipulation will 
lead specifically to a truth evaluation mindset. However, it might well be that the mindset 
which is induced is more a “spelling evaluation” mindset. Regardless of those specifics, this 
manipulation produced meaningful effects in PEP probe trials for Müller and Rothermund, 
and is thus worth utilising here. Our fourth experiment was identical to our third experiment, 
but now with spelling evaluation as the catch trial task. 
Method  
Participants. Our final sample consisted of 434 participants (144 men, 288 women, 1 
non-binary, 1 no gender given) with mean age of 30.85 years (SD = 10.82). 225 participants 
completed the RT-PEP; 209 completed the MT-PEP. Across our analyses, this provides us 
with 90% power to detect a minimal Cohen’s d effect size of d = 0.41 (i.e., in our linear 
regression with three interactive predictors).  
Materials. Sentences in the PEPs were presented in two forms: with and without a 
spelling mistake. Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for both the Classic (a = 0.88, 95% CI 
[0.87, 0.90]) and Modern (a = 0.86, 95% CI [0.84, 0.88]) Scales were again acceptable. 
Results  
Hypothesis Testing. In mixed-effects analyses, we found significant pro-immigrant 
effects in both the RT-PEP, β = -0.03, 95% CI [-.0, 0.02], p < .001, and the MT-PEP, β = -
.05, 95% CI [-.07, -.04], p < .001. We found a similar pattern of results in fixed-effects 
analyses: significant pro-immigrant PEP effects for the RT-PEP, t(109) = 4.99, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.48, 95% CI = [0.28, 0.68], and for the MT-PEP, t(107) = 7.83, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.75, 95% CI = [0.54, 0.97] (see Figure 6). However, we did not find a 
significant correlation between PEP scores and self-reported beliefs for the RT-PEP (r = .12, 
95% CI [-.07, .30], p = .205) or the MT-PEP (r = .04, 95% CI [-.15, .22], p = .710).  
 
Figure 6. Time-normalised mouse trajectories for pro- and anti-immigrant trials in the MT-
PEP control condition (Experiment 4). 
 
 Group-level faking effects were larger in the MT-PEP than the RT-PEP, β = -0.30, 
95% CI [-0.57, -0.04], p = .025. As in our third experiment, this was in the opposite direction 
to our expectations (see Table 4). PEP effects did not significantly differ between the faking 
and control conditions in RT-PEP, β = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.03], p = .231, but did in the 
MT-PEP, β = 0.05, 95% CI [0.03, 0.07], p < .001, with faking participants exhibiting smaller 
MT-PEP effects than control participants.  
Table 4. Mean (standardised) group-level effects in the RT- and MT-PEP in Experiment 4. 
Experimental condition PEP variant 
 RT-PEP MT-PEP 
Control -0.10 (0.17) -0.19 (0.24) 
Faking -0.05 (0.17) -0.06 (0.25) 
  
We did not find the expected impact of condition and PEP variant on the relationship 
between PEP scores and self-reported beliefs (β = 0.11, 95% CI [-.29, .51], p = .584). Put 
briefly, only the RT-PEP in the faking condition significantly predicted self-report scores. 
However, this effect did not significantly differ between the control and faking conditions of 
the RT-PEP, β = 0.05, 95% CI [-.23, .33], p = .726 (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Beta coefficients (95% CIs in square brackets) for the prediction of self-report 
scores for each condition and each PEP variant in Experiment 4. 
MT-PEP Control .04 [-.15, .23] 
Faking -.02 [-.22, .18] 
RT-PEP Control .12 [-.07, .31] 
Faking .20* [.02, .38] 
 
Exploratory Testing. Standardised effect sizes did not significantly differ between 
the MT-PEP and RT-PEP, t(216) = 21.29, p = .195, Cohen’s d = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.44]. 
MT-PEP split-half reliabilities were higher than RT-PEP reliabilities, but all reliabilities were 
poor (Table 4). RTs in the MT-PEP were shorter on pro- compared to anti-immigrant trials, β 
= -0.03, 95% CI [-.04, -.01], p < .001. We also found a faking effect for RTs in the MT-PEP: 
β = .02, 95% CI [.00, .04], p = .014.  
Across all four experiments, we assessed participants’ beliefs about what was being 
measured within the PEP. Table 6 outlines the trends of these responses (coded 
independently by the first and second author). In brief: substantially fewer participants 
expected mouse movements, compared to RTs, were being measured.  
Table 6. The number (and percentage) of participants who answered that either (i) mouse 
movements or (ii) response times were the dependent variable of interest, for each of our four 
experiments. 
Experiment Procedure Outcome variable Suspected Inter-rater 
agreement 
Experiment 1 MT-PEP Mouse 
movements 
2 (4%) 94% 
Response times 20 (40%) 
Experiment 2 MT-PEP Mouse 
movements 
0 (0%) 76% 
Response times 16 (35%) 
Experiment 3 MT-PEP Mouse 
movements 
5 (5%) 95% 




Response times 15 (14%) 
Experiment 4 MT-PEP Mouse 
movements 
4 (2%) 94% 




Response times 50 (23%) 
 
General Discussion  
Is the MT-PEP valid and reliable? 
Our results represent support for the MT-PEP as a valid and reliable relational 
implicit measure. For group-level beliefs, the MT-PEP demonstrated effects when using 
factual stimuli (Cohen’s d = 1.02 in Experiment 1, Cohen’s d = 1.36 in Experiment 2) and for 
race-related stimuli (Cohen’s d = 1.25 in Experiment 3, Cohen’s d = 0.75 in Experiment 4). 
In similar contexts, the IAT produces an effect size around Cohen’s d = 0.6 – 0.75 (e.g., 
Agosta & Sartori, 2013; Frantz et al., 2004; Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014). The MT-PEP 
demonstrated mixed validity as a measure of individual differences in self-reported beliefs. In 
Experiment 3, MT-PEP scores correlated strongly with self-reported beliefs (r = 0.41). For 
comparison, the correlation between IAT scores and self-report beliefs tends to be between 
.20 and .35 (Hofmann et al., 2005; Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014). However, when catch trials 
did not involve truth evaluation, the MT-PEP no longer correlated with self-reported beliefs 
(Experiment 4). This difference also affected the MT-PEP’s split-half reliability (r = .83 in 
Experiment 3, r = .39 in Experiment 4).  
Are MT-PEP effects implicit?  
 MT-PEP effects can be considered implicit in the sense of “fast” (Moors & De 
Houwer, 2007). Responses in the MT-PEP generally occurred quickly (Experiment 1 M = 
995ms; Experiment 2 M = 805ms; Experiment 3 Control M = 603ms; Experiment 3 Faking M 
= 565ms; Experiment 4 Control M = 575ms, Experiment 4 Faking M = 588ms). These RTs 
are consistent with RTs in other “fast” implicit measures such as the IAT, AMP, and EPT 
(Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014). One might argue that responding in the MT-PEP is less fast than 
other measures because participants can process parts of the sentence stimuli before the final 
word of the sentence appeared. However, the meaning of sentences was most often apparent 
only after the final word had been presented. Hence, the impact of the truth value of the 
sentence on responding likely occurred quickly. Effects in the MT-PEP also appear to occur 
without awareness, as few participants (0-5%) correctly stated that mouse movements were 
being measured.  
Some have suggested the PEP reflects unintentional truth evaluation (e.g., Müller & 
Rothermund, 2019). However, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that participants 
can intentionally fake beliefs (indicating intentional truth evaluation). In hindsight, this is 
unsurprising. Until participants see the prompt word, they cannot know whether the truth 
value of the sentence will be relevant (catch trials) or not (probe trials). Hence, they might 
always intentionally process whether sentences are true or false. PEP effects thus likely 
reflect an intentionally-initiated truth evaluation that occurs quickly, is measured indirectly 
(i.e., by assessing responding to the probes), and without awareness. The intentional nature of 
PEP effects is supported by the fact that MT-PEP effects increase with greater proportions of 
catch trials, and that PEP effects predict self-reports only when catch trials involve truth 
evaluation. Group-level PEP effects still arise when catch trials do not involve truth 
evaluation, but to the detriment of reliability and predictive utility.  
PEP effects reflecting quickly-emitted intentional truth evaluation is also in line with 
the observation in Experiment 2 that MT-PEP effects were influenced by the automatic truth 
value of sentences. When participants have little time to intentionally truth-evaluate a 
sentence (e.g., “a whale is a fish”), they might be inclined to believe that it is false, even 
when it is true. Hence, (MT-)PEP effects might provide a useful tool to tap into the early 
stages of intentional truth evaluation, that is, before participants evaluate the truth in a 
deliberate, well-considered manner.2 The idea that PEP effects reflect quickly-emitted 
intentional truth evaluation also aligns with the unexpected finding that the MT-PEP was less 
fakeable than the RT-PEP at the group-level. Both the MT-PEP and RT-PEP reflected 
intentional truth evaluation in line with the goals of the task (i.e., to express anti-immigrant 
beliefs), and the mouse trajectories within the MT-PEP simply reflected this to a greater 
extent than the RTs of the RT-PEP. 
The MT-PEP vs. the Race-MT. 
 
2 Exploratory analyses of Experiment 2 data showed that participants erred more on catch trials for atypical- 
compared to typical-exemplars. This suggests that automatic truth value influences responding even when 
participants deliberatively truth-evaluate. It also supports the idea that the PEP effects on probe trials reflect 
what happens at an early stage during intentional truth evaluation: both PEP effects on probe trials and errors on 
catch trials reflect spontaneous (i.e., fast) beliefs.   
 After conducting our experiments, we discovered that our procedure is similar to 
another mousetracking procedure used to assess automatic racial biases: the Race-MT 
(Melnikoff et al., 2020; based on Wojnowicz et al., 2009). This procedure involved 
presenting Black/White names and positive/negative concepts as stimuli, with the response 
options “Like” or “Dislike”. Participants were required (via feedback) to respond “Like” to 
names of Black and White people, and exhibited larger AUCs in responding “Like” to Black 
names compared to White names. Although similar, the MT-PEP has the distinct advantage 
of incorporating relational information into its stimuli. Additionally, Melnikoff et al.’s 
procedure involved tying response options to a single feature of stimuli (e.g., liking). 
However, racial groups (and groups in general) can be attached to multiple features (e.g., 
intelligence, perceived dangerousness, etc.; Hughes et al., 2020). By focusing on the truth 
evaluation of presented sentences, the MT-PEP can investigate multiple features 
simultaneously, as well as the different ways social groups relate to these features.  
 The Race-MT is similar to catch trials on the MT-PEP (with the exception that 
participants are given feedback in the Race-MT). The Race-MT and MT-PEP in principle 
could be interfaced to take advantage of both procedures. Indeed, Melnikoff et al. identified 
two limitations of the Race MT method: its small effect sizes, and the fact that (in some 
contexts) a more indirect measure may outperform it. The MT-PEP offers large group-level 
effect sizes, and is more indirect. As such, interfacing the Race-MT method into the catch 
trials of the MT-PEP may help to overcome the limitations of both procedures, and provide 
researchers with a robust and powerful tool to gain insight into beliefs.  
 Conclusion.  
 We found that the MT-PEP consistently produced strong group-level effects for both 
factual and subjective beliefs. These effects can be described as automatic: they were 
produced quickly by participants and occurred outside of awareness. The PEP also predicted 
self-reported beliefs, but only when catch trials involved intentional truth evaluation. Our 
findings provide some initial support for the MT-PEP as a measure of automatic beliefs, but 
also highlight boundary conditions for its usefulness. However, at a time when confidence in 
“classic” implicit measures is waning (Cummins et al., 2019; Schimmack, 2019), the MT-
PEP offers a number of novel advantages, and overcome issues associated with other 
procedures.   
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